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Abstract
Let K be an arbitrary Kripke model of Heyting Arithmetic, HA. For every node k in K,
we can view the classical structure of k, Mk as a model of some classical theory of arithmetic.
Let T be a classical theory in the language of arithmetic. We say K is locally T, iff for every
k in K, Mk |= T. One of the most important problems in the model theory of HA is the
following question: Is every Kripke model of HA locally PA? We answer this question negatively.
We provide two new Kripke model constructions for this matter. The first one is a direct
construction of a Kripke model K  HA + ECT0 (ECT0 stands for Extended Church Thesis)
with the root r such that Mr 6|= I∆1 and hence K is not even locally I∆1. Not only the
existence of this model completely solves the problem, but this result is also almost tight in
terms of the power of induction axioms that can be failed in Mk because every node of a Kripke
model of HA classically satisfies induction for formulas that are provably ∆1 in PA. The second
Kripke model construction is an implicit way of doing the first construction which works for any
reasonable consistent intuitionistic arithmetical theory T with a recursively enumerable set of
axioms that has Existence property. From the second construction we construct a Kripke model
K  HA+¬θ+MP (θ is an instance of ECT0 and MP is Markov principle) with the root r such
that Mr 6|= I∆1. Also, we will prove that every countable Kripke model of intuitionistic first-
order logic can be transformed into another Kripke model with the full infinite binary tree as
the Kripke frame such that both Kripke models force the same sentences. So with the previous
result, there is a binary Kripke model K of HA such that K is not locally PA.
1 Introduction
Heyting Arithmetic (HA) is the intuitionistic counterpart of Peano Arithmetic (PA). HA has the
same non-logical axioms as PA with intuitionistic first-order logic as the underlying logic. This
theory is one of the well-known and most studied theories of constructive mathematics, and it was
investigated in many proof-theoretic and model-theoretic aspects in the literature (see [17] for more
information). This paper aims to answer a question about the model theory of HA. Let T be a
classical theory in the language of arithmetic. A Kripke model of HA is called locally T, iff for every
node k ∈ K, the classical structure associated with k, which we denote it by Mk is a model of T.
One of the most important problems in the model theory of HA is the following question:
Problem 1.1 Is every Kripke model of HA locally PA?
∗e.khaniki@gmail.com
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This problem was first asked and investigated in the seminal paper [18] by van Dalen et al. in
1986. They proved that every finite Kripke model of HA is locally PA. Furthermore, they proved
that a Kripke model of HA with the Kripke frame (ω,≤) as the underlying frame has infinitely
many locally PA nodes. This work initiated a research line around Problem 1.1 and also about the
following general question:
Problem 1.2 For a Kripke model K of the theory T in a language σ, and a node k ∈ K, what is
the relationship between the sentences forced in k and the sentences satisfied in Mk?
There are several works around these problems. We will review those works in the following.
Wehmeier in [19], investigated Problem 1.1 and extended the results of [18] to a larger class of
frames. In particular, he proved that every Kripke model of HA with (ω,≤) as the Kripke frame is
indeed locally PA. Moniri, in [12], considered these problems and proved that every once-branching
Kripke model of HA+MP (Markov Principle) is locally PA. Ardeshir and Hesaam in [4] generalized
results of [19] to rooted narrow Kripke models of HA. Recently, Mojtahedi in [11] considered Prob-
lem 1.2 and answered this problem in the case of finite depth Kripke models. As a by-product, he
generalized the result of [4] to semi-narrow Kripke models of HA.
Regarding Problem 1.1, the strongest positive result about the strength of induction axioms that
are satisfied in a node of a Kripke model of HA was proved by Markovi in [10]. He proved that every
node of a Kripke model of HA satisfies induction for formulas that are provably ∆1 in PA. Also,
from Π2 conservativity of PA over HA, we know that every Kripke model of HA is locally ThΠ2(PA).
Buss did another direction of research around these problems in [8]. For every language σ and
every classical theory T in it, he characterized the sentences that are true in every locally T Kripke
model. As a result, he proved that HA is complete with respect to the locally PA Kripke models. In a
similar direction, Ardeshir et al. in [7] presented a set of axiom systems for the class of end-extension
Kripke models. As a by-product, they proved HA is strongly complete for its class of end-extension
Kripke models.
The above results are probably all results relevant to Problem 1.1 in the literature. There are
some other papers such as [1, 2] that investigated Problem 1.2 in general and partially answered this
question, but their results are valid for every Kripke model; hence we cannot get much information
from them for Problem 1.1.
In this paper, we will present two new model construction to answer Problems 1.1 and 1.2.
The main technical theorem of the first construction says that the theory HA + ECT0 + Diag(M)
for every M |= ThΠ2(PA) has Existence and Disjunction property (Theorem 3.5). This theorem
provides the right tool for constructing rooted Kripke models of HA with control over the structure
of the root (Theorem 3.8). We will construct a Kripke model of HA+ ECT0 that is not even locally
I∆1. This answers Problem 1.2 negatively. The second construction is an implicit way of doing
the first construction and it works for any reasonable consistent intuitionistic arithmetical theory
with a recursively enumerable set of axioms that had Existence property (Theorem 3.15). As an
application of the second construction, we will construct a Kripke model of HA+¬θ+MP where θ is
an instance of ECT0 and MP is Markov principle that is not locally I∆1. The second construction is
general and it also works for HA+ECT0, but some Kripke models can be constructed for HA+ECT0
with the first construction, but it is not possible with the second one. We will discuss this matter
in more detail at the end of Section 3. The new model constructions imply the existence of a large
class of Kripke models of reasonable intuitionistic arithmetical theories including HA, which cannot
be constructed by the previous methods, so we think regardless of their application to Problem 1.1,
these model constructions are also interesting in their own rights. We will also prove that every
countable Kripke model of intuitionistic first-order logic can be transformed into another Kripke
model with the full infinite binary tree as the Kripke frame (Lemma 4.1). Using this result, we will
prove that there exists a Kripke model of HA with the full infinite binary tree as the Kripke frame
that is not locally I∆0 (Corollary 4.3).
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Arithmetical Theories
Let L be the language of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic in which it has a function symbol for every
primitive recursive function. HA is the intuitionistic theory with the following non-logical axioms:
1. Axioms of Robinson Arithmetic Q.
2. Axioms defining the primitive recursive functions.
3. For each formula φ(x, ~y) ∈ L, the axiom ∀~y Iφ in which
Iφ := φ(0¯) ∧ ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(Sx))→ ∀xφ(x).
PA is the classical theory that has the same non-logical axioms as HA. iPRA (intuitionistic Primitive
Recursive Arithmetic) has axioms of Q and induction for every atomic formula of L. The underlying
logic of iPRA is intuitionistic logic. PRA is the classical counter part of iPRA. T ⊢c φ means that
there exists a proof of φ from axioms of T using first-order classical logic Hilbert system. ⊢i denotes
the same thing for intuitionistic proofs. An important set of intuitionistic arithmetical theories for
the purpose of this paper is defined in the following definition.
Definition 2.1 I is the set of all intuitionistic arithmetical theories T in L such that:
1. T is consistent.
2. iPRA ⊆ T.
3. The set of axioms of T is recursively enumerable.
Note that with the power of primitive recursive functions we can define finite sequences of numbers,
so we can code finite objects such as formulas, proofs, and etc. as numbers. This is a standard
technique and it is called Go¨del numbering (see [16]). With the help of this coding we can talk
about proofs of theories in arithmetical theories (see [16]). For every L sentence φ, pφq denotes the
number associated with φ. If φ(x) is an L formula, then pφ(c˙)q denotes the number associated with
ψ(x) when we substitute the numeral with value c for x. Suppose T ∈ I. Let Axiom(x, y) be the
primitive recursive function such that for every L sentence φ, φ is a T-axiom iff ∃xAxiom(x, pφq) is
true. Then it is possible to define the provability predicate of T, ProofT(x, y) as a primitive recursive
predicate as follows. Let 〈.〉 be a natural primitive recursive coding function. Then ProofT(x, y) is
true iff there exist two sequences L sentences {φi}i≤n and numbers {wi}i≤n for some n such that:
1. x = 〈〈w1, pφ1q〉 , ..., 〈wn, pφnq〉〉.
2. For every i ≤ n:
(a) If wi > 0, then Axiom(wi − 1, pφiq) is true.
(b) If wi = 0, then φi can be derived from {φj}j<i by one of the rules of Natural deduction
system for intuitionistic first-order logic.
3. y = pφnq.
The Σ1 formula PrT(y) is the abbreviation for ∃xProof(x, y). So consistency of T, Con(T), is
¬PrT(p⊥q). The following theorem states the useful facts about PrT.
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Theorem 2.2 For every T ∈ I the following statements are true:
1. For every L sentence φ, if T ⊢i φ, then PRA ⊢c PrT(pφq).
2. PRA ⊢c ∀x, y(PrT(x) ∧ PrT(x→ y)→ PrT(y)).
3. PRA ⊢c ∀x, y(PrT(x) ∧ PrT(y)→ PrT(x ∧ y)).
4. For every L formula φ(x) with x as the only free variable, PRA ⊢c PrT(p∀xφ(x)q)→ ∀xPrT(pφ(x˙)q).
5. For every Σ1 formula φ(~x), PRA ⊢c ∀~x(φ(~x)→ PrT(pφ(x˙1, ..., x˙n)q)).
Proof. See [16] for a detailed discussion of these statements. ⊣
2.2 Realizability
For proving the first model construction theorem, we need some definitions and theorems about
Kleene’s realizability.
Definition 2.3 Let T (x, y, z) be the primitive recursive function called Kleene’s T-predicate and
U(x) be the primitive recursive function called result-extracting function. Note that
HA ⊢i ∀x, y, z, z
′(T (x, y, z) = 0 ∧ T (x, y, z′) = 0→ z = z′).
We use T (x, y, z) instead of T (x, y, z) = 0 for simplicity. For more information, see section 7 of the
third chapter of [17].
Let j1(x) and j2(x) be the primitive recursive projections of the pairing function j(x, y) = 2
x · (2y+
1) ∸ 1. Kleene’s realizability is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 xrφ (x realizes φ) is defined by induction on the complexity of φ where x 6∈ FV (φ).
1. x r p := p for atomic p,
2. x r (ψ ∧ η) := j1(x) r ψ ∧ j2(x) r η,
3. x r (ψ ∨ η) := (j1(x) = 0 ∧ j2(x) r ψ) ∨ (j1(x) 6= 0 ∧ j2(x) r η),
4. x r (ψ → η) := ∀y(y r ψ → ∃u(T (x, y, u) ∧ U(u) r η), u 6∈ FV (η),
5. x r ∃yψ(y) := j2(x) r ψ(j1(x)),
6. x r ∀yψ(y) := ∀y∃u(T (x, y, u) ∧ U(u) r ψ(y)), u 6∈ FV (ψ).
Definition 2.5 A formula φ ∈ L is almost negative iff φ does not contain ∨, and ∃ only immediately
in front of atomic formulas.
Definition 2.6 The extended Church’s thesis is the following schema, where φ is almost negative:
ECT0 := ∀x(φ(x)→ ∃yψ(x, y))→ ∃z∀x(φ(x)→ ∃u(T (z, x, u) ∧ ψ(x, U(u)))).
Next theorem explains the relationships between, HA, ECT0 and Kleene’s realizability.
Theorem 2.7 For every formula φ ∈ L:
1. HA+ ECT0 ⊢i φ↔ ∃x(x r φ),
2. HA+ ECT0 ⊢i φ⇔ HA ⊢i ∃x(x r φ).
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Proof. See Theorem 4.10 in the fourth chapter of [17]. ⊣
Another important properties of HA are the Existence and Disjunction properties. We will use
notation n¯ as the syntactic term corresponds to natural number n.
Theorem 2.8 The following statements are true:
1. Disjunction property: For every sentences φ, ψ ∈ L, if HA ⊢i φ∨ψ, then HA ⊢i φ or HA ⊢i ψ,
2. Existence property: For every sentence ∃xφ(x) ∈ L, if HA ⊢i ∃xφ(x), then there exists a
natural number n such that HA ⊢i φ(n¯).
Proof. See Theorem 5.10 of the third chapter of [17]. ⊣
Although HA is an intuitionistic theory, it can prove decidability of some restricted class of
formulas. The next theorem explains this fact.
Theorem 2.9 For every quantifier free formula φ ∈ L, HA ⊢i φ ∨ ¬φ.
Proof. See [17]. ⊣
2.3 Kripke models
A Kripke model for a language σ is a triple K = (K,≤,M) such that:
1. (K,≤) is a nonempty partial order.
2. For every k ∈ K, Mk ∈M is a classical structure in the language σ(Mk) = σ ∪ {c|c ∈Mk}.
3. For every k, k′ ∈ K, if k ≤ k′, then σ(Mk) ⊆ σ(Mk′ ) and also Mk′ |= Diag+(Mk) (Mk is a
sub-structure of Mk′).
For every Kripke modelK, there is a uniquely inductively defined relation⊆ K×
(⋃
k∈K σ(Mk)
)
that is called forcing.
Definition 2.10 For every k ∈ K, and every sentence φ ∈ σ(Mk), the relation k  φ is defined by
induction on complexity of φ:
1. k  p iff Mk |= p, for atomic p,
2. k  ψ ∧ η iff k  ψ and k  η,
3. k  ψ ∨ η iff k  ψ or k  η,
4. k  ¬ψ iff for no k′ ≥ k, k′  ψ,
5. k  ψ → η iff for every k′ ≥ k, if k′  ψ, then k′  η,
6. k  ∃xψ(x) iff there exists c ∈ σMk such that k  ψ(c),
7. k  ∀xψ(x) iff for every k′ ≥ k and every c ∈ σ(Mk′ ), k
′
 ψ(c).
We use the notation K  φ (φ ∈
⋂
k∈K σ(Mk) is a sentence) as an abbreviation that for every
k ∈ K, k  φ which simply means that the Kripke model K forces φ. The important property of the
forcing relation is its monotonicity. This means that for every k′ ≥ k and every φ ∈ σ(Mk), if k  φ,
then k′  φ. Also, note that first-order intuitionistic logic is sound and has strong completeness
with respect to the Kripke models. For more details see [17].
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3 Kripke model constructions for intuitionistic arithmetical
theories
3.1 The first model construction
We will explain the first model construction in this subsection. This construction will be presented
in a sequence of lemmas and theorems.
Lemma 3.1 For every quantifier-free formula φ ∈ L there exists an atomic formula p ∈ L with the
same free variables such that HA ⊢i φ↔ p.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ and using Theorem 2.9. ⊣
Lemma 3.2 Let 〈.〉 and (.)x be a primitive recursive coding and decoding functions, then for every
formula Qx1, ..., xnφ(~x, ~y) ∈ L where Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and n > 0,
HA ⊢i Qx1, ..., xnφ(~x, ~y)↔ Qxφ((x)0, ..., (x)n, ~y).
Proof. Straightforward by properties of the coding and decoding functions. ⊣
We will use notation φ([x], ~y) instead of φ((x)0, ..., (x)n, ~y) for simplicity.
Theorem 3.3 For every Π2 sentence φ := ∀~x∃~yψ(~x, ~y), if HA+ ECT0 ⊢i φ, then PA ⊢c φ.
Proof. Let φ be a Π2 sentence and HA+ECT0 ⊢i φ. By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.1 there exists an atomic
formula p(x, y) such that HA ⊢i φ ↔ ∀x∃yp(x, y) and therefore HA + ECT0 ⊢i ∀x∃yp(x, y). By
Theorem 2.7 HA ⊢i ∃n(n r ∀x∃yp(x, y)). Because ∃n(n r ∀x∃yp(x, y)) is a sentence, there exists a
natural number n such that HA ⊢i n¯ r ∀x∃yp(x, y). Therefore by definition of the realizability:
1. ⇒ HA ⊢i ∀x∃u(T (n¯, x, u) ∧ U(u) r ∃yp(x, y)),
2. ⇒ HA ⊢i ∀x∃u(T (n¯, x, u) ∧ j2(U(u)) r p(x, j1(U(u)))),
3. ⇒ HA ⊢i ∀x∃u(T (n¯, x, u) ∧ p(x, j1(U(u)))),
4. ⇒ HA ⊢i ∀x∃up(x, u),
hence PA ⊢c φ. ⊣
In the rest of the paper, for every L structure M, TM means HA+ ECT0 + Diag(M).
Theorem 3.4 If M |= ThΠ1(PA), then TM is consistent.
Proof. Suppose TM is inconsistent, so there exists a finite number of L(M) sentences {φi(~ci)}i≤n ⊆
Diag(M) such that HA+ECT0+
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci) ⊢i ⊥, therefore HA+ECT0 ⊢i ¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci). Because ~ci
are not used in the axioms of HA+ECT0, we have HA+ECT0 ⊢i ∀ ~x1, ..., ~xn(¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi)). Note that
∀ ~x1, ..., ~xn(¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi)) is a Π1 sentence and therefore by Theorem 3.3, PA ⊢c ∀ ~x1, ..., ~xn(¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi)).
This implies that M |= ∀ ~x1, ..., ~xn(¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi)) and especially M |= ¬
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci), but by defini-
tion of Diag(M) we know M |=
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci) and this leads to a contradiction, hence TM is consistent.
⊣
If an L structure M satisfies a strong enough theory of arithmetic, then TM has actually the
Existence and Disjunction properties.
Theorem 3.5 (Existence and Disjunction Properties). Suppose M is a model of ThΠ2(PA), then
the following statements are true:
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1. For every L(M) sentence ∃zφ(z) such that TM ⊢i ∃zφ(z), there exists a constant symbol
c ∈ LM such that TM ⊢i φ(c).
2. For every L(M) sentence φ ∨ ψ such that TM ⊢i φ ∨ ψ, TM ⊢i φ or TM ⊢i ψ.
Proof.
1. Suppose φ(z) is ψ(z,~d) such that ψ(z, ~y) is an L formula. By assumption of the theorem there
exists a finite number of L(M) sentences {φi(~ci)}i≤n ⊆ Diag(M) such that
HA+ ECT0 +
n∧
i=1
φi(~ci) ⊢i ∃zψ(z,~d),
so HA+ECT0 ⊢i
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci)→ ∃zψ(z,
~d). BecauseL(M) constants that appear in
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci)→
∃zψ(z,~d) are not used in the axioms of HA+ ECT0, therefore
HA+ ECT0 ⊢i ∀~y, ~x1, ..., ~xn(
n∧
i=1
φi(~xi, ~y)→ ∃zψ(z, ~y)).
Note that
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi, ~y) is a quantifier free formula, hence by Lemma 3.1 there exists an atomic
formula p such that HA ⊢i p(~x1, ..., xn, ~y) ↔
∧n
i=1 φi(~xi, ~y). Also note that by Theorem 2.9
HA ⊢i p ∨ ¬p, hence
HA+ ECT0 ⊢i ∀~y, ~x1, ..., ~xn∃z(p(~x1, ..., ~xn, ~y)→ ψ(z, ~y)).
By Lemma 3.2 HA+ ECT0 ⊢i ∀x∃z(p([x]) → ψ(z, [x])). Note that ∀x∃z(p([x]) → ψ(z, [x])) is
an L sentence and therefore by Theorems 2.7 and 2.8 there exists a natural number n such
that
HA+ ECT0 ⊢i n¯ r ∀x∃z(p([x])→ ψ(z, [x])).
By definition of realizability we get
HA+ ECT0 ⊢i ∀x∃u(T (n¯, x, u) ∧ U(u) r ∃z(p([x])→ ψ(z, [x]))).
Note that HA + ECT0 ⊢i ∀x∃uT (n¯, x, u), hence by Theorem 3.3 PA ⊢c ∀x∃uT (n¯, x, u) and
therefore M |= ∀x∃uT (n¯, x, u). Let M |= e =
〈
~c1, ..., ~cn, ~d
〉
and M |= T (n¯, e, f)∧U(f) = g for
some e, f, g ∈M. This implies T (n¯, e, f), U(f) = g ∈ Diag(M) and therefore we get
TM ⊢i T (n¯, e, f) ∧ g r ∃z(p([e])→ ψ(z, [e])).
By applying realizability definition we get TM ⊢i j2(g) r (p([e])→ ψ(j1(g), [e])). Note that by
Theorem 2.7,
HA+ ECT0 ⊢i v r (p[x]→ ψ(w, [x]))→ (p([x])→ ψ(w, [x])),
so
TM ⊢i p([e])→ ψ(j1(g), [e]).
Because p([e]) ∈ Diag(M), we get TM ⊢i ψ(j1(g), [e]) and this implies TM ⊢i ψ(c, [e]) for some
c ∈ L(M) such that M |= j1(g) = c.
2. Suppose TM proves φ ∨ ψ, therefore TM ⊢i ∃x((x = 0→ φ) ∧ (x 6= 0→ ψ)). By the previous
part there exists a constant symbol c ∈ L(M) such that TM ⊢i (c = 0 → φ) ∧ (c 6= 0 → ψ).
Note that c = 0 is an atomic formula, hence c = 0 ∈ Diag(M) or c 6= 0 ∈ Diag(M) and this
implies TM ⊢i φ or TM ⊢i ψ.
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⊣Definition 3.6 Let M be an L structure and T be an intuitionistic theory in the language L(M).
For every L(M) sentence φ such that T 0i φ, fix a Kripke model Kφ  T such that Kφ 1 φ.
Definition 3.7 Let M be an L structure and T be an intuitionistic theory in the language L(M).
Define S(M,T) = {φ ∈ L(M)|T 0i φ, φ is a sentence}. Define the universal model K(M,T) as
follows. Take the disjoint union {Kφ}φ∈S(M,T) and then add a new root r with domain Mr = M.
Theorem 3.8 If M is a model of ThΠ2(PA), then K(M,TM) is a well-defined Kripke model and
for every L(M) sentence φ, K(M,TM)  φ⇔ TM ⊢i φ.
Proof. First note that by Theorem 3.4 TM 0 ⊥, hence S(M,TM) is not empty and therefore
K(M,TM) has other nodes except r. To make sure that K(M,TM) is well-defined, we should
check the three conditions in the definition of Kripke models. It is easy to see that the first two
conditions hold for K(M,TM). For the third condition, we need to show that for every node k 6= r,
L(Mr) ⊆ L(Mk) and Mk |= Diag
+(Mr). By definition of K(M,TM), L(Mr) ⊆ L(Mk) holds. For
the condition Mk |= Diag+(Mr), note that TM ⊢i Diag(M) which implies Mk |= Diag(Mr).
(⇒). Let K(M,TM)  φ. If TM 0i φ, then Kφ exists and Kφ ⊆ K(M,TM). By the assumption
we get Kφ  φ, but this leads to a contradiction by definition of Kφ, hence TM ⊢i φ.
(⇐). We prove this part by induction on the complexity of φ:
1. φ = p: Note that if TM ⊢i p, then p ∈ Diag(M). Because if p 6∈ Diag(M), then
¬p ∈ Diag(M), hence TM ⊢i ⊥ which leads to a contradiction by Theorem 3.4. Therefore
p ∈ Diag(M) and by the fact that M |= p we get K(M,TM)  p.
2. φ = ψ ∧ η: By the assumption we get TM ⊢i ψ and TM ⊢i η, therefore by the induction
hypothesis K(M,TM)  ψ and K(M,TM)  η, hence K(M,TM)  ψ ∧ η.
3. φ = ψ ∨ η: By Theorem 3.5 TM ⊢i ψ or TM ⊢i η, therefore by the induction hypothesis
K(M,TM)  ψ or K(M,TM)  η, hence K(M,TM)  ψ ∨ η.
4. φ = ψ → η: By the assumption for every θ ∈ S(M,TM), Kθ  ψ → η, so for proving
K(M,TM)  ψ → η we only need to show that if r  ψ, then r  η. Let r  ψ,
therefore we have K(M,TM)  ψ, hence by the previous part, TM ⊢i ψ. Note that By
the assumption TM ⊢i ψ → η, hence TM ⊢i η and therefore by the induction hypothesis
K(M,TM)  η which implies r  η.
5. φ = ∃xψ(x): By Theorem 3.5 there exists a constant symbol c ∈ L(M) such that TM ⊢i
ψ(c), therefore by the induction hypothesis K(M,TM)  ψ(c), hence K(M,TM) 
∃xψ(x).
6. φ = ∀xψ(x): By the assumption for every θ ∈ S(M,TM), Kθ  ∀xψ(x), so for proving
K(M,TM)  ∀xψ(x) we only need to show that for every c ∈ M, r  ψ(c). Let c ∈ M.
By the assumption TM ⊢i ∀xψ(x), therefore TM ⊢i ψ(c), hence by induction hypothesis
K(M,TM)  ψ(c). This implies that r  ψ(c). Note that c is interpreted by c ∈ M,
hence k  ψ(c).
⊣
The last theorem gives us the right tool for constructing a counter example for Problem 1.1. In
general we can get a lot of new models for every M |= ThΠ2(PA). For our purpose, it is sufficient to
know ThΠ2(PA) 0c PA to get the result. The next two theorems established the stronger fact which
says ThΠ2(PA) 0c I∆1. I∆1 is a classical theory in the language L with the following non-logical
axioms:
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1. Axioms of Robinson Arithmetic Q.
2. Axioms defining the primitive recursive functions.
3. ∆1 induction:
∀~y [∀x(φ(x, ~y)↔ ¬ψ(x, ~y))→ Iφ]
for every Σ1 formulas φ, ψ ∈ L
For stating the theorems we need also another arithmetical theory that is called BΣ1 with the
following non-logical axioms:
1. Axioms of Robinson Arithmetic Q.
2. Axioms defining the primitive recursive functions.
3. Induction for quantifier free formulas.
4. Bounded Σ1 collection:
∀~y, x [∀z(z < x→ ∃wφ(z, w, ~y))→ ∃r∀z(z < x→ ∃w(w < r ∧ φ(z, w, ~y))]
for every Σ1 formulas φ, ψ ∈ L
It is worth mentioning that these theories usually are defined over the language of Peano Arithmetic,
and not over the language of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, hence our definitions of I∆1 and BΣ1
are stronger than the usual definition, but for our use this does not cause a problem. Now we know
the definitions, we will state the theorems.
Theorem 3.9 There exists a model M |= ThΠ2(N) such that M 6|= BΣ1.
Proof. See [3]. ⊣
Theorem 3.10 I∆1 c ⊣⊢c BΣ1.
Proof. As we explained before, this version of these theories are stronger that the original ones.
Therefore by the result of [14] these two theories are the same. ⊣
Corollary 3.11 There exists a rooted Kripke model of HA+ ECT0 which is not locally I∆1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9 there exists a model M |= ThΠ2(PA) such that M 6|= BΣ1 and hence by
Theorem 3.10 M 6|= I∆1. Note that by Theorem 3.8, K(M,TM)  HA + ECT0, and K(M,TM) is
not locally I∆1. ⊣
ECT0 is a very powerful non-classical axiom schema, so a natural question is that: Is it the case
that for every Kripke model K  HA+ECT0 and every node k in K, Mk 6|= PA ? This question has
a negative answer, because K(N,TN)  HA+ ECT0, but Mr |= PA.
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3.2 The second model construction
In this subsection, we will explain the generalized construction which works for any reasonable
intuitionistic arithmetical theory. We will also mention an application of it at the end of this
subsection.
For every T ∈ I, the Existence property of T is the following Π2 sentence:
EP(T) := ∀x(x = p∃yφ(y)q for some formula φ(y) ∧ x is a sentence ∧ PrT(x)→ ∃yPrT(pφ(y˙)q)).
For an L structure M and a theory T ∈ I, let extension of T with respect to M be the following
theory:
EXT(M,T) := {φ ∈ L(M)|φ is a sentence,M |= PrT(pφq)}.
The following lemma states that EXT(M,T) is closed under finite conjunctions.
Lemma 3.12 Let M |= PRA and T ∈ I. Then for every L(M) sentences φ and ψ, if φ, ψ ∈
EXT(M,T), then φ ∧ ψ ∈ EXT(M,T).
Proof. If φ, ψ ∈ EXT(M,T), then M |= PrT(pφq)∧PrT(pψq), so by Theorem 2.2 M |= PrT(pφ∧ψq).
Hence φ ∧ ψ ∈ EXT(M,T). ⊣
Define CM,T := T+ EXT(M,T). The crucial property of CM,T is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.13 Suppose M |= PRA. Then for every T ∈ I and every L(M) sentence ψ, if CM,T ⊢i ψ,
then M |= PrT(pψq).
Proof. Let ψ(~d) be an L(M) sentence such that CM,T ⊢i ψ(~d). So there exists a finite number of
L(M) sentence {φi(~ci)}i≤n ⊆ EXT(M,T) such that
T ⊢i
n∧
i=1
φi(~ci)→ ψ(
~d).
Because L(M) constants that appear in
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci)→ ψ(
~d) are not used in the axioms of T, therefore
T ⊢i ∀~y, ~x1, ..., ~xn(
n∧
i=1
φi(~xi, ~y)→ ψ(~y)).
So by Theorem 2.2
M |= PrT(p∀~y, ~x1, ..., ~xn(
n∧
i=1
φi(~xi, ~y)→ ψ(~y))q).
Hence again by Theorem 2.2
M |= PrT(p
n∧
i=1
φi(~˙ci)→ ψ(
~˙
d)q).
On the other hand by Lemma 3.13 EXT(M,T) is closed under finite conjunctions, so
∧n
i=1 φi(~ci) ∈
EXT(M,T) which means M |= PrT(p
∧n
i=1 φi(
~˙ci)q). So by Theorem 2.2 M |= PrT(pψ(
~˙
d)q). ⊣
Theorem 3.14 For every T ∈ I and every M |= PRA+ EP(T) + Con(T), the following statements
are true:
1. CM,T is consistent.
2. CM,T has Existence and Disjunction property.
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Proof.
1. Suppose CM,T ⊢i ⊥. Then by Lemma 3.13 M |= PrT(p⊥q), but this is not possible because
we assumed M |= Con(T), hence CM,T is consistent.
2. We will prove the Existence property of CM,T. The Disjunction property will follow from it by
the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Let ψ(x) be a formula in L(M) with only
x as the free variable. Suppose CM,T ⊢i ∃xψ(x). Then by Lemma 3.13 M |= PrT(p∃xψ(x)q).
Note that M |= EP(T), hence M |= ∃xPrT(pψ(x˙)q). This means there exists a c ∈ M such
that M |= PrT(pψ(c˙)q). This implies ψ(c) ∈ EXT(M,T), so CM,T ⊢i ψ(c).
⊣
This is the generalized version of the Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.15 Let T ∈ I and M |= PRA+ EP(T) + Con(T). Then K(M,CM,T) is a well-defined
Kripke model and for every L(M) sentence φ, K(M,CM,T)  φ⇔ CM,T ⊢i φ.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as the proof of the Theorem 3.8 by using
the Theorem 3.14. The only part that needs some extra work is the fact that CM,T ⊢i Diag(M) and
moreover if CM,T ⊢i p for atomic p, then p ∈ Diag(M).
Let p ∈ Diag(M). We know by Theorem 2.2 M |= p → PrT(ppq). This implies M |= PrT(ppq).
So p ∈ EXT(M,T) which implies CM,T ⊢i p.
Now if we haveCM,T ⊢i p for some atomic L(M) sentence p, then by Lemma 3.13M |= PrT(ppq).
Note that M |= Con(T), so in presence of PRA, M |= Π1-RFN(T) which Π1-RFN(T) is the following
sentence:
∀x(x ∈ Π1 ∧ PrT(x)→ Tr(x))
where Tr is a natural Π1 formula which works as the truth predicate for Π1 sentence. Substituting
ppq for x in Π1-RFN(T), we get M |= Tr(ppq), hence M |= p which means p ∈ Diag(M). ⊣
As we already see, using the first construction, we provide a Kripke model of HA+ ECT0 which
is not locally I∆1. A natural conjecture would be that the existence of such a Kripke model was
possible because the base theory has a very powerful non-classical schema ECT0. As an application
of Theorem 3.15 we will show this is not the case. Let H(x) be a Σ1 formula that is a natural
formalization of the statement ”The Turing machine with code x halts on input x”. Let θ be an
instance of ECT0 in Definition 2.6 such that φ(x) := ⊤ and ψ(x, y) := (y = 0∧H(x))∨(y 6= 0∧¬H(x)).
We also need the definition of Markov principle.
Definition 3.16 The Markov principle is the following schema:
MP := ∀~y(∀x(φ(x, ~y) ∨ ¬φ(x, ~y)) ∧ ¬¬∃xφ(x, ~y)→ ∃xφ(x, ~y)).
Lemma 3.17 The following statements are true:
1. HA+ ¬θ +MP is consistent.
2. HA+ ¬θ +MP has Existence and Disjunction properties.
Proof.
1. It is easy to see that PA ⊢c ¬θ and also PA ⊢c MP. So HA + ¬θ +MP is a sub-theory of PA
and it is consistent.
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2. We will prove the Existence property of HA + ¬θ +MP here. The Disjunction property will
follow from it like before. This part is a standard application of Kripke models (see [15]). Let
∃xψ(x) be an L sentence such that HA+¬θ+MP ⊢i ∃xψ(x), but for every natural number n,
HA+¬θ+MP 6⊢i ψ(n¯). It is well-know thatK(N,HA+¬θ+MP) is a well-defined Kripke model
and moreoverK(N,HA+¬θ+MP)  HA (see Theorem 5.2.4 in [15]). Moreover we can assume
that K⊥ (Note that ⊥ ∈ S(N,HA + ¬θ + MP)) is a Kripke model with just one node with
the classical structure N. Note that r 1 θ, because otherwise by the monotonicity of forcing
relation for every φ ∈ S(N,HA+¬θ+MP), Kφ  θ which is not true. Moreover for every node
k 6= r, k  ¬θ, so with the last argument r  ¬θ which impliesK(N,HA+¬θ+MP)  ¬θ. Note
that MP is forced in every node k 6= r. So we only need to show that r  MP. For this matter
suppose r  ∀x(φ(x, ~¯a)∨¬φ(x, ~¯a))∧¬¬∃xφ(x, ~¯a) where ~a ∈ N. If for every n ∈ N, r 1 φ(n¯, ~¯a),
then because of decidability of φ(x, ~¯a) in the point of view of r, for every n ∈ N, r  ¬φ(n¯, ~¯a).
This implies K⊥  ∀x¬φ(x, ~¯a). But this leads to a contradiction becauseK⊥  ¬¬∃x¬φ(x, ~¯a).
This means that there exists a natural number n such that r  φ(n¯, ~¯a).
By the above arguments, we have
K(N,HA+ ¬θ +MP)  HA+ ¬θ +MP.
So K(N,HA+¬θ+MP)  ∃xψ(x). This implies that there exists a natural number n such that
r  ψ(n¯). But this leads to a contradiction because we know Kψ(n¯) 1 ψ(n¯). This implies that
our assumption was false and there exists a natural number n such that HA+¬θ+MP ⊢i ψ(n¯).
⊣
Corollary 3.18 There exists a rooted Kripke model of HA+ ¬θ +MP which is not locally I∆1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9 there exists a model M |= ThΠ2(N) such that M 6|= BΣ1 and hence by
Theorem 3.10 M 6|= I∆1. Note that by Lemma 3.17 HA+ ¬θ +MP is consistent and has Existence
property. This implies that EP(HA + ¬θ +MP) and Con(HA + ¬θ +MP) are true in N. Note that
these sentences are Π2, so they are also true in M. This implies that M satisfies the conditions
needed in the Theorem 3.15, hence
K(M,CM,HA+¬θ+MP)  HA+ ¬θ +MP
and also it is not locally I∆1. ⊣
It is worth mentioning that HA+ ¬θ +MP does not prove anything contradictory with PA and
in some sense, it is closed to PA, but still, we were able to construct a Kripke model of it which is
not locally I∆1.
As we already mentioned in the Introduction, we can get more Kripke models for HA + ECT0
from the first construction than by the second construction. We will show this fact in the rest of
this subsection. For this matter, we need the following theorem.
Theorem 3.19 For any constant k, there is no consistent Πk-axiomatized theory T such that T ⊢c
PA.
Proof. See [9]. ⊣
Theorem 3.20 The following statements are true:
1. For every L structure M, if K(M,CM,HA+ECT0)  HA+ECT0, then K(M,TM)  HA+ECT0.
2. There exists an L structure M such that K(M,TM)  HA+ ECT0, but K(M,CM,HA+ECT0) 1
HA.
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Proof.
1. Suppose K(M,CM,HA+ECT0)  HA+ ECT0. Let φ := ∀~x∃~yψ(~x, ~y) be a Π2 sentence such that
PA ⊢c φ. Then by Π2 conservativity of HA over PA, we haveHA ⊢i φ, henceK(M,CM,HA+ECT0) 
φ. This implies r  ∀~x∃~yψ(~x, ~y). So for every ~a ∈M:
(a) ⇒ r  ∃~yψ(~a, ~y),
(b) ⇒ there exist ~b ∈M such that r  ψ(~a,~b),
(c) ⇒M |= ψ(~a,~b).
HenceM |= φ. This implies thatM |= ThΠ2(PA), so by Theorem 3.8K(M,TM)  HA+ECT0.
2. By Go¨del second Incompleteness theorem, PA + ¬Con(PA) is consistent. So this implies
that ThΠ2(PA) + ¬Con(HA) is also consistent. ThΠ2(PA) + ¬Con(HA) is a Π2-axiomatized
theory, hence by Theorem 3.19 there exists a model M |= ThΠ2(PA) + ¬Con(HA) such
that M 6|= PA. Note that by Theorem 3.8 K(M,TM)  HA + ECT0. On the other hand
M |= ¬Con(HA+ ECT0), so ⊥ ∈ EXT(M,HA+ ECT0). This implies CM,HA+ECT0 ⊢i ⊥. Hence
S(M,CM,HA+ECT0) = ∅. This means that K(M,CM,HA+ECT0) has only one node r such that
Mr = M. Note that M 6|= PA, so r 6 HA and this completes the proof.
⊣
4 On binary Kripke models for intuitionistic first-order logic
In this section, we will prove that every countable rooted Kripke model K (there exists a node k in
K such that for every k in K, k ≤ k′) can be transformed to a Kripke model K′ with the infinite
full binary tree as Kripke frame such that K and K′ force the same sentences. Let Γ = {0, 1} and
Γ∗ be the set of all finite binary strings (including empty string λ). For every x, y ∈ Γ∗, x  y iff x
is a prefix of y.
Lemma 4.1 Let K = (K,≤,M) be a countable rooted Kripke model in a language σ. Then there is
an onto function f : Γ∗ → K, such that:
1. K′ = (Γ∗,,M′) is a Kripke model with M′ is defined as M′x = Mf(x) for every x ∈ Γ
∗,
2. for every k ∈ K, for every σ(Mk) sentence φ, and for every x ∈ Γ∗ such that f(x) = k, x  φ
iff k  φ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume (K,≤) is a tree (see Theorem 6.8 in the second
chapter of [17]) with the root r. Also, we can assume that for every k ∈ K, there is a k′ ∈ K different
from k such that k ≤ k′. This is true because for every k ∈ K that does not have relation with any
other nodes, we can put an infinite countable path above k such that the classical structure of every
node in this path is Mk. This transformation does not change the sentences that were forced in the
original model. For every k ∈ K, define neighbor of k as
Nk = {k
′ ∈ K|k ≤ k′ ∧ k 6= k′ ∧ ∀k′′ ∈ K(k ≤ k′′ ∧ k′′ ≤ k′ → k = k′′ ∨ k′ = k′′)}.
For every k ∈ K, fix an onto function gk : N→ Nk such that for every k′ ∈ Nk, {n ∈ N|gk(n) = k′}
is infinite. Now we define f inductively with a sequence of partial function f0 ⊂ f1 ⊂ ... and then
we put f =
⋃
n∈N fn. Put f0(λ) = r. For a function h, let Dom(h) be domain of h. Let
An = {x ∈ Γ
∗|x ∈ Dom(fn), x0 6∈ Dom(fn), x1 6∈ Dom(fn)}.
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Now fn+1 is defined inductively from fn as follows:
fn+1(x) =


fn(x) x ∈ Dom(fn)
fn(y) x = y0
m, for some y ∈ An,m ∈ N
gfn(y)(m) x = y0
m1, for some y ∈ An,m ∈ N.
It is easy to see that Dom(f) = Γ∗.
Claim 4.2 For every k ∈ K, for every x ∈ Γ∗ if f(x) = k, then
{k′ ∈ K|k ≤ k′} = {f(y) ∈ K|y ∈ Γ∗, x  y}.
This claim is easy to prove considering the definition of f and the fact that gk functions enumerate
neighbors infinitely many times.
Using this claim, we can finish the proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of
φ. We will only mention a nontrivial case in the induction steps. All other cases can be treated
similarly. Let φ := ψ → η and k  ψ → η. Let x ∈ Γ∗ be such that f(x) = k. Suppose for some
y  x, we know y  ψ. So by the induction hypothesis, f(y)  ψ and by Claim 4.2, we know
f(y) ≥ k, hence f(y)  η, therefore by the induction hypothesis we get y  η, so x  φ. ⊣
Corollary 4.3 There exists a Kripke model of HA with (Γ∗,) as the Kripke frame that is not
locally I∆1.
Proof. Let K be a rooted Kripke model with the root r in a language σ. Let U be a countable
set of sentences of σ. It is easy to see that K can be represented by a suitable two-sorted classical
structure MK such that:
1. For every φ ∈ U , ”r  φ” is first-order definable in MK by the sentence φF .
2. For every φ ∈ U , ”Mr |= φ” is first-order definable in MK by the sentence φM .
By applying the downward Lo¨wenheimSkolem theorem on MK we get a countable substructure of
MK like M′K such that:
1. M′
K
is a representation of a countable rooted Kripke model in the language σ.
2. For every φ ∈ U , MK |= ψ iff M′K |= ψ, for ψ ∈ {φF , φM}.
Let K(M,TM) be the rooted Kripke model from Corollary 3.11. Let U = HA ∪ {ϕ} where ϕ is an
instance of ∆1 induction that fails in the classical structure of the root of K(M,TM). Following the
same argument on K(M,TM) and U , we get a countable rooted Kripke model K′ of HA that is not
locally I∆1. Hence applying Lemma 4.1 on K
′ finishes the proof. ⊣
5 Concluding remarks and Open problems
Problem 1.1 can be asked about other theories than HA. One can ask the same question about
arithmetic over sub-intuitionistic logic too. One of these logics is Visser’s Basic logic, and its ex-
tension Extended Basic logic. The model theory of arithmetic over these logics were investigated in
[13, 5, 6]. From the point of view of Problem 1.1, it is proved in [4] that every irreflexive node in
a Kripke model of BA (Basic Arithmetic) is locally I∃+1 . So In general, every irreflexive node in a
Kripke model of the natural extension of BA such as EBA (Extended Basic Arithmetic) is locally
IΣ1 (see Corollary 3.33 in [6]). Also it is proved in [6] that every Kripke model of EBA is locally
ThΠ2(IΣ1) + ThΠ1(PA). Note that every Kripke model of HA is also a Kripke model of BA and
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EBA. So Corollary 3.11 applies to these theories too, and this solves Problem 1.1 for these theories.
Furthermore, this shows that the known positive results are the best we can get for BA and EBA.
Focusing on the proof of Theorem 2.8, we essentially use ECT0 for proving the Existence and Dis-
junction property of TM. We do not know whether ECT0 is essential for such a model construction,
so we have the following question:
Problem 5.1 Does theory HA+ Diag(M) has the Existence property for every M |= ThΠ2(PA)?
An important problem which we could not answer is the following:
Problem 5.2 Is there any Kripke model K  HA such that for every node k in K, Mk 6|= PA?
Another unsolved question in the direction of completeness with respect to locally PA Kripke
models is the following:
Problem 5.3 Does HA have completeness with respect to its class of locally PA Kripke models?
By the result of [8], for every sentence φ such that HA 0i φ, there exists a locally PA Kripke model
K such that K 6 φ, but this result does not say anything about whether K is a Kripke model of
HA or not.
We call a rooted tree Kripke frame (K,≤), a PA-frame iff for every Kripke model K  HA with
frame (K,≤), K is locally PA. Let FPA be the set of all PA-frames. We know that semi narrow
rooted tree Kripke frames are in FPA. On the other hand, by Corollary 4.2 infinite full binary tree
is not in FPA. So we have the following question:
Problem 5.4 Is there a nice characterization of FPA?
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